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Minority nationalism and immigrant integration in Canada

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ABSTRACT. Immigrant integration is currently a prominent issue in virtually all contemporary democracies, but countries in which the historic population itself is deeply divided – particularly those with substate nations and multiple political identities – present some interesting questions where integration is concerned. The existence of multiple and potentially competing political identities may complicate the integration process, particularly if the central government and the substate nation promote different conceptions of citizenship and different nation-building projects. What, then, are the implications of minority nationalism for immigrant integration? Are the added complexities a barrier to integration? Or do overlapping identities generate more points of contact between immigrants and their new home? This article addresses this question by probing immigrant and non-immigrant ‘sense of belonging’ in Canada, both inside and outside Quebec. Data come from Statistics Canada’s Ethnic Diversity Study. Our results suggest that competing nation-building projects make the integration of newcomers more, rather than less, challenging.

KEYWORDS: Canada, immigration, integration, national identity, nationalism, Quebec

Introduction

The integration of immigrant minorities has surged to the top of the political agenda throughout many contemporary democracies.¹ The potent mix of changing immigration flows, new forms of racial and religious diversity and the heightened politics of security has triggered intense debates about social integration and social cohesion. In many countries, the reaction is fuelled by fears that immigration threatens the culture and traditions of the host population. But the emphasis on social integration also reflects concerns that newcomers have only a weak sense of attachment and commitment to their new home, that they do not feel they really belong, and that they do not engage in the civic and political life of the society around them. In extreme cases, commentators worry about the danger of parallel societies emerging within host countries.

While the anxieties have a transnational reach, the realities of immigrant integration on the ground are deeply conditioned by the historic forms of

ethnic diversity within each country. In some countries, the process is defined by a relatively homogeneous host culture on one hand and diverse newcomers on the other. In other countries, however, the historic host population is itself divided in complex ways, fragmenting the 'we' that newcomers are expected to join. This pattern is most marked in countries such as Belgium, Canada, Spain and the UK, where substate nations have developed a distinctive political identity and exercise significant political autonomy within the contours of the larger state (Gagnon et al. 2003; Keating 1996, 2001; Greer 2007; McEwen 2006; Conversi 1997).

Such historic divisions have important implications for immigrant integration. At the level of the country as a whole, the existence of multiple and potentially competing political identities can complicate the integration process. This is particularly the case if the central state and the substate nation promote different conceptions of citizenship and different nation-building projects – in effect, competing for the affections of newcomers. At the regional level, immigration into the homeland of national minorities such as Quebec, Flanders or Catalonia can also generate added tensions. Such immigration has the potential to dilute the culture of the national minority, affect the prospects for nationalist mobilisation, and upset historic balances between the substate nation and the majority in the country as a whole. Not surprisingly, national minorities seek to forestall such possibilities by shaping immigration and integration policies where they can (Zapata-Barrero 2009; Hepburn 2009; Hussain and Miller 2006; Kymlicka 2001; Shafir 1995).

What are the implications of minority nationalism for immigrant integration? Do the added complexities represent a barrier to integration, making the transition more difficult than in the rest of the country? Or do overlapping political identities generate more points of potential contact between immigrants and their new home? This article seeks to answer these questions in the case of Canada.

The Canadian case is compelling for several reasons. First, Canada faces the formidable challenge of integrating large numbers of immigrants from many parts of the globe. First-generation immigrants – i.e. the foreign-born population – formed approximately twenty per cent of the total population according to the 2006 Census, and their integration is a constant preoccupation in the country. Second, Canada is a multination state, and historic divisions among its 'founding peoples' retain their political force. The divide between the English- and French-speaking communities has framed the politics of the northern half of the north American continent since 1763.² Francophone Quebecers see themselves as, and are increasingly recognised as, a minority nation within the Canadian state. During the second half of the twentieth century, a powerful nationalist movement emerged within the province and the Quebec provincial government held referenda on the creation of a sovereign Quebec state in 1980 and 1995. As a result, the politics of social integration do not simply pit 'old' Canadians against 'new' Canadians. Divisions within the ranks of the 'old' shape the country's response to the 'new';

and the 'new' are sufficiently numerous to upset traditional relations among the 'old'. Third, immigrant integration within Quebec is complicated by competing nation-building agendas advanced by the central state and the provincial government. The constitution divides authority over the key instruments of diversity policy – immigration, settlement and citizenship – between the federal and provincial governments, and the province of Quebec plays a much larger role than do other regional authorities. Moreover, the federal government and the Quebec government each articulate and defend different conceptions of the political community that newcomers are asked to join. The federal government seeks to build attachment to the pan-Canadian political community, while the Quebec government gives primacy to the Québécois nation. This process of competitive nation-building, with its competition for the affection of immigrants, has no parallel in the rest of the country.

This article examines the implications of minority nationalism and competitive nation-building for immigrant integration by examining the sense of 'belonging' among old and new Canadians in Quebec, and by comparing the patterns with those in the rest of the country. The article is organised in three sections. The first examines the distinctive context of immigrant integration in Quebec. The following section presents our measures of social integration, our data and our findings, while the final section discusses the implications of our results.

Quebec: substate nationalism and competitive nation-building

As in the rest of Canada, immigration is changing the face of Quebec and especially the city of Montreal (see Table 1). While immigrants represent a smaller proportion of the total population than in other major centres such as Toronto and Vancouver, nevertheless roughly twenty per cent of Montreal's population are first-generation immigrants. Moreover, those immigrants are as diverse as in other metropolitan areas. Roughly thirty-five per cent of immigrants are from European source countries, almost thirty per cent from Asia and the Middle East, nearly fifteen per cent from Africa, and roughly ten per cent from each of Central and South America and the Caribbean and Bermuda.

While the patterns of diversity in Montreal are similar to those in other major Canadian cities, immigrants to Quebec do face a more complex political environment than in the rest of the country. First, the politics of immigrant multiculturalism meet the politics of minority nationalism directly. Within the province, Quebecers of French-Canadian ancestry represent a strong majority; within the larger Canadian and North American contexts, however, they are a minority and often feel anxious about the future of their language and culture. Historically, this sense of vulnerability has made the tension between an ethnic and a more civic form of nationalism more immediate than in the rest of the country (Breton 1988). Immigration has often been seen as a potential threat

Table 1. *Visible minority populations in Montreal, Quebec, Toronto and Vancouver*

	<i>Province</i>				
	<i>Canada</i>	<i>of Quebec</i>	<i>Montreal</i>	<i>Toronto</i>	<i>Vancouver</i>
Immigrants	19.8%	11.5%	19.9%	42.7%	37.3%
Place of origin					
USA	4.0%	3.1%	2.3%	1.8%	3.0%
Central and South America	6.2%	9.2%	8.8%	6.7%	2.8%
Caribbean and Bermuda	5.1%	9.5%	10.3%	7.5%	0.7%
Europe	36.8%	36.0%	34.4%	29.9%	21.9%
UK	9.4%	1.9%	1.7%	5.4%	7.7%
Other northern and western Europe	7.9%	10.9%	8.4%	2.9%	5.0%
Eastern Europe	8.3%	8.5%	8.9%	8.4%	4.9%
Southern Europe	11.3%	14.7%	15.4%	13.1%	4.4%
Africa	6.1%	14.6%	14.7%	5.1%	3.3%
Asia and the Middle East	40.8%	27.4%	29.3%	48.8%	65.4%
West Central Asia and the Middle East	6.0%	9.5%	10.2%	6.4%	4.4%
Eastern Asia	14.1%	6.2%	6.3%	15.4%	35.6%
Southeast Asia	9.1%	6.6%	7.1%	9.3%	13.0%
Southern Asia	11.6%	5.0%	5.7%	17.8%	12.3%
Oceania and other countries	1.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	2.9%

Source: 2006 Census, from tables reported on the Statistics Canada website (www.statcan.ca).

to the traditional culture – especially during the post-war era, when the birth rate among the French-speaking community was declining rapidly and immigrants tended to assimilate to the English language and culture. At various periods, Quebec nationalists have worried that the English language might come to dominate in Montreal, the metropolitan heart of the province. Moreover, for the secessionist – or ‘sovereignist’ – forces in the province, increasing numbers of immigrants in the electorate have represented a barrier to their dreams of a separate Quebec state: non-Francophone newcomers tend to vote for federalist parties and opposed separation from Canada strongly in both 1980 and 1995. There has been some growth in non-Francophone immigrant support for sovereignty over the past two decades (see Gagné and Langlois 2002; Lavoie and Serré 2002; Serré 2002; Bélanger and Perrella 2008; Nadeau and Fleury 1995). Nevertheless, the frustrations of sovereignists have erupted from time to time. Most notably, after the loss of the 1995 referendum by 0.3 per cent of the vote, the premier of Quebec complained that sovereignty had been defeated by ‘l’argent puis des votes ethniques’, unsympathetically translated in the English press as ‘money and the ethnic vote’.³ In earlier periods, studies often concluded that Quebecers of French-Canadian descent

were more opposed to immigration and less comfortable with ethnic and cultural pluralism than other Canadians (Berry et al. 1976; Lambert and Curtis 1982, 1983). More recent evidence suggests that opposition to immigration has faded (Gidengil et al. 2004), but the sensitivity of the issues remains.

Second, the complexity of the context is reinforced by the engagement of two levels of government in diversity policy. Outside Quebec, the federal government plays a leading role, setting the parameters governing immigration and settlement programmes.⁴ Within Quebec, however, the provincial government has carved out a larger role and both levels of government are major players. Utilising its powers under section 95 of the Constitution, Quebec established its own ministry of immigration in 1968 and negotiated a series of agreements on immigration with the federal government. Under these agreements, the Quebec government is responsible for the selection of economic immigrants intending to settle in the province, and has established its own points system, which differs from the federal approach – especially in giving greater weight to French-language skills. The federal government remains responsible for family reunification and the two governments select refugees jointly. As a result, both governments are involved in deciding who can immigrate to Quebec (Garcea 1998). Power over critical steps in the integration process is also divided. The provincial government has full authority over settlement services and integration programmes for newcomers, allowing it to develop distinctive programmes.⁵ But the federal government retains sole authority over the granting of citizenship across the country, including in Quebec.

Each level of government articulates a distinctive conception of the nature of the community that newcomers are joining. Quebec has developed its own approach to multicultural policy, known as interculturalism, which encourages newcomers to develop a sense of belonging to the Quebec political community. Both Quebec's interculturalism and federal multiculturalism seek to affirm and accommodate ethno-cultural diversity, subject to commitments to liberal democratic values. But the Quebec model has distinctive features. First, while federal multiculturalism promotes the choice of two official languages (English and French), the Quebec model defines French as the language of public life in the province. Beginning in 1972, the province adopted a series of increasingly powerful language and education laws that steer immigrants into the Francophone community (McAndrew et al. 2000). These policies were highly controversial when they were enacted, with Quebec nationalists and immigrant communities mobilising massively on opposing sides. At important stages, the provincial language laws also came into conflict with the federal language regime, including the language provisions of the constitutionally entrenched Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Nevertheless, the predominance of French is a non-negotiable element of the Quebec approach to social integration.⁶ Second, while federal multiculturalism is seen as implying the equal recognition of all cultures, negating the centrality of any particular

culture, Quebec's intercultural approach defines the Francophone majority culture as the central hub towards which other minority cultures are expected to converge (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007; Labelle and Rocher 2004). As a result, there is a subtle balancing act within interculturalism as the model seeks to retain a connection to a specific history and culture on one hand and respect for pluralism on the other.⁷ This balancing act is especially complex for the Quebec sovereigntist movement: 'The paradox is that the more civic or liberal the movement becomes, and the more it moves away from its thick socio-cultural roots towards the trend of postnational citizenship, the more its justifications for sovereign status are weakened' (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007: 115).

Differences between multiculturalism and interculturalism have been reinforced more recently by the growing salience of religion in debates over diversity. Public discourse in Quebec gives greater weight to secularism in public spaces than in the rest of the country. In 2007, the premier of the province described the separation of the state and religion as one of the fundamental values of the Quebec nation (Charest 2007; Québec 2007: 25–7). Many Quebecers fear that this commitment to *laïcité* is challenged by the greater religiosity of many newcomers to the provinces, especially within the Muslim and Sikh communities. The result has been a series of controversies around dress and the wearing of religious symbols in schools, on the sports field and elsewhere; these debates seem sharper than those in other parts of the country. The government appointed a major consultative commission on the reasonable accommodation of ethno-religious differences, led by two senior scholars of diversity, Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor. After a calming report from the commission (Bouchard and Taylor 2008), tensions seemed to subside. But public opinion polls reveal continuing tensions (Leduc 2009). In early 2010, the Quebec government introduced legislation to bar women wearing the niqab from receiving public services or working in the public sector; in 2011, the Quebec Assemblée Nationale passed a motion banning Sikhs wearing the ceremonial kirpin from entering the building.

In effect, immigrants to Quebec are swept up into two nation-building projects; two conceptions of the community they are encouraged to join. The Quebec government encourages minorities to join its national project of building a distinct society in Quebec. The federal government emphasises attachment to the pan-Canadian community, and has important tools to bring to the context. In particular, it retains authority over the granting of citizenship. The study guide that the federal government gives to immigrants preparing for the citizenship test, the formal ceremonies at which citizenship is formally awarded and the oath of loyalty that newcomers take are all celebrations of Canada, replete with Canadian flags and symbols. As a result, 'two identity-making processes that are in conflict with each other are operating simultaneously towards ends that are at odds with each other' (Labelle and Rocher 2004: 275) (also Labelle and Rocher 2009; Gagnon and Iacovino 2007: 122; Salée 2007: 122; Juteau et al. 1998).

These dynamics have no parallel in other provinces. How do they influence the integration of newcomers? There are surprisingly few analyses of this question. Some studies based on qualitative interviews have found that Quebec's policies of interculturalism are viewed as suspect among many immigrant communities (Salée and Labelle 2001; Helly and Schendel 2001; Helly 2002). For example, Labelle found that many of her minority respondents 'shared an ethnicised view of the Quebec identity which is reflected by the recurrent and pejorative image, marked in their discourse, of *Québécois pure laine*' (Labelle 2004: 57–8). However, there appears to be only one study comparing the sense of integration in Quebec and the pattern prevailing in the rest of the country. Bilodeau et al. (2010) found that, in contrast to the rest of the country, immigrants to Quebec are less likely to embrace the identities and loyalties of the population in their province, and express greater support for the federal government than do their neighbours. Otherwise, we have little evidence of how Canadian dualism and competitive nation-building matter to the integration of newcomers.

Social integration in Quebec and the rest of Canada

Do the differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada, and the competitive nation-building strategies at work in the province, find echoes in the sense of belonging and engagement of immigrants there? There would seem to be four logical possibilities.

1. Strong Canada / strong Quebec

In this hypothesis, immigrant communities actually benefit from the competitive nation-building projects of Canada and Quebec. Quebec nationalists need the support of immigrants to win a referendum on sovereignty or simply to sustain support for significant autonomy within the federation. Ottawa also needs the loyalty of immigrants for its own nation-building purposes. As a result, both governments have an incentive to provide stronger support to immigrants than the other, producing a dynamic of out-bidding by both governments. This implies that immigrants might combine strong feelings of attachment to Canada with a stronger sense of belonging in Quebec than in other provinces, because other provincial governments do not need to compete for the loyalty of immigrants in the same way.

2. Strong Canada / weak Quebec

In this hypothesis, Quebec nation-building is more 'ethnic' than pan-Canadian nation-building, and immigrants are more likely to feel excluded from the larger Quebec society. Even if the Quebec model is not inherently more ethnic in nature, the more active debates about these issues in the province may

overshadow the commitment to pluralism in interculturalism, with the result that the Quebec approach is perceived as more exclusionary by immigrants. In either case, we would expect to see lower levels of attachment to province in Quebec than in the other provinces (Bilodeau et al. 2010). This would not necessarily imply a lower level of attachment to Canada as a whole. Indeed, immigrants might view Canada as their defender against the potential exclusiveness of Quebec nationalism, as evidenced by their overwhelming no vote in the 1995 referendum.

3. Weak Canada / strong Quebec

In this hypothesis, Quebec nation-building is not seen as exclusionary by immigrant minorities, and the package of policies related to education, language and interculturalism eventually predominate in the integration process. In the first instance, newcomers in Quebec may think of themselves as coming to Canada; but in time they come to adopt the identity and attachment of the majority in Quebec. In this scenario, the sense of attachment to the pan-Canadian political community weakens and the sense of belonging and engagement in Quebec grows over time and across generations.

4. Weak Canada / weak Quebec

In this hypothesis, immigrants to Quebec do not develop a strong attachment to either Quebec or Canada. Such an outcome might reflect several processes. Immigrants to the province might resent the fact that they are swept up into competitive nation-building projects and are told, in effect, to choose their primary loyalty. They did not come to Canada to be recruited into an internal struggle. Alternatively, immigrants may simply feel confused about what is being asked or expected of them, given the conflicting signals from Quebec City and Ottawa. From the point of view of immigrants, this might be a welcome outcome. The historic confrontation between French and English Canada may create a sociocultural space that immigrant groups can occupy alone, leaving them freer to maintain a more distant relationship to the wider society (Anctil 1984: 450). In both cases, however, the result would be a lower sense of attachment to both Quebec and Canada.⁸

Measuring social integration

We measure social integration by exploring immigrants' sense of belonging in the country. A sense of belonging seems to capture two related feelings. In part, it reflects the person's sense of attachment to the country; but it also reflects the extent to which that person feels accepted by other denizens of the place. We compare the sense of belonging of majorities and minorities in Quebec and in the rest of the country.

In thinking about the social integration of immigrants, we distinguish between white or 'majority' immigrants – most of whom have come from the traditional European sources of immigration to Canada – and racial-minority immigrants, most of whom have come from newer source countries since the reformation of Canadian immigration policy in 1967. There is substantial evidence that the experience of white and racial-minority immigrants is different in many ways.

We also highlight the role of time in the integration process. Until recently, Canadians tended to assume that integration was a relatively smooth, steady process over time and across generations. The common assumption was that immigrants would become increasingly integrated into the Canadian mainstream as their years in the country pass. While the process would not be complete in one generation, the second generation – the children of immigrants born in Canada – would be much more integrated than their parents, speaking English or French with flawless Canadian accents, matching if not surpassing the educational achievements of their peers, and moving effectively into the workforce. The second generation might feel some tugging between the culture of their parents' homeland and Canadian culture, but the integrative process would certainly be complete by the third generation. Members of this generation would be less likely to speak their grandparents' home language, more likely to marry outside their ethnic group and be comfortable swimming in the Canadian mainstream.

This comfortable assumption of steady integration across generations has recently come under challenge. For example, Reitz and Banerjee (2007) conclude that in the case of racial minorities, the second generation is less integrated than their immigrant parents on such dimensions as their sense of belonging, perceived discrimination, sense of vulnerability and propensity to vote. Some of the conclusions have been challenged, especially about the propensity of second-generation minorities to vote (Palmer 2006; Soroka et al. 2007). But the general pattern of weaker attachment – of an element of disillusion, perhaps – in second-generation immigrants is important. Therefore, we track the integration process across generations in both Quebec and the rest of the country.

Data, indicators and controls

The data for this analysis come from the Ethnic Diversity Study (EDS), a telephone survey examining the ethno-cultural background of the Canadian population.⁹ The EDS was conducted by Statistics Canada in 2002. It is a 'postcensal' survey, using the 2001 Census to define and select its sample. In this case, the sample was based on ethnic origin, place of birth, and place of birth of parents (and, by implication, immigrant status). The sample size was roughly 42,500. Of these, 10,686 were first-generation immigrants, 15,317 were second-generation and 14,979 were third-generation or more. Some 8,199

respondents were 'visible minority' or racial minority (using the Census definition); 32,655 were, for lack of a better term, the 'visible majority', or white Canadians.¹⁰

The sense of belonging is captured using the following question: 'Some people have a stronger sense of belonging to some things than others. Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not strong at all and 5 is very strong, how strong is your sense of belonging to . . .'

Because all residents of Canada – immigrants and native-born alike – live in multiple communities, we focus on the sense of belonging to three distinct political domains: (a) 'Canada'; (b) 'your province'; and (c) 'your town, city or municipality'. As it turns out, levels of belonging are, overall, relatively high and there are a limited number of cases in the lower categories. Therefore, we collapse the belonging responses (a 1–5 scale) into two categories, which offer a little more variance for estimation purposes. (See Appendix for discussion.) In the following tables, belonging variables are coded as 1 for respondents saying they belong 'very strongly' and 0 otherwise.

Previous research makes it clear that we need to avoid confusing the effects of the immigration experience with other factors that we know influence the sense of belonging among Canadians generally. Therefore, we 'control' for the effects of gender, age, education and income. Age, for instance, clearly covaries with immigrant status. Roughly thirty-eight per cent of respondents who were members of the third or subsequent generations were under thirty-five years old. However, the immigrant generations differed dramatically: just twenty-four per cent of the first-generation sample was under thirty-five, but forty-five per cent of second-generation respondents fell into this category. The difference was even more marked between white and racial-minority immigrants: the under-thirty-five category made up thirty-two per cent of white immigrants and fifty-six per cent of racial-minority respondents. These differences matter.

Income was similarly related to immigration: in our sample, first-generation immigrants had lower average incomes; Quebecers also had lower incomes than the sample from the rest of the country. Accordingly, in order to examine the effects of immigration, racial-minority status and region – independent of these other demographic and economic variables – we present in the following section average levels of belonging and turnout, estimated from regression models that include gender, age, education and income as controls. Full details on the specification of control variables, and on sample sizes for each subgroup, are included in the Appendix.

Results

Analysis of the patterns of social integration indicates that the regional difference that matters is that between Quebec and the rest of the country. Regional variations within the rest of the country are limited, and therefore we focus on

Table 2. Full regression models: belonging in country, province and town

	<i>Dependent variable</i>		
	<i>Country</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>Town</i>
1 st gen minority Quebec	-0.068** (0.027)	0.095*** (0.027)	0.178*** (0.027)
2 nd gen minority Quebec	-0.269*** (0.031)	-0.126*** (0.029)	-0.031 (0.030)
1 st gen majority Quebec	-0.164*** (0.022)	0.033 (0.021)	0.066*** (0.021)
2 nd gen majority Quebec	-0.217*** (0.016)	0.032** (0.016)	0.054*** (0.015)
3 rd + gen majority Quebec	-0.360*** (0.010)	0.052*** (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)
1 st gen minority ROC	-0.075*** (0.011)	0.110*** (0.011)	0.161*** (0.011)
2 nd gen minority ROC	-0.124*** (0.012)	-0.037*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.012)
3 rd + gen minority ROC	-0.053* (0.031)	-0.037 (0.029)	-0.005 (0.028)
1 st gen majority ROC	-0.071*** (0.010)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.072*** (0.009)
2 nd gen majority ROC	-0.020*** (0.008)	0.017** (0.007)	0.014* (0.007)
Female	0.036*** (0.006)	0.052*** (0.005)	0.072*** (0.005)
Age: 35–54	0.139*** (0.006)	0.121*** (0.007)	0.111*** (0.006)
Age: 55+	0.266*** (0.006)	0.242*** (0.008)	0.225*** (0.008)
Education (more than HS)	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.090*** (0.006)	-0.086*** (0.005)
Income group (1–10)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)
N	32,180	32,121	32,116

Cells contain marginal change coefficients from binary probit regression models, with standard errors in parentheses.
ROC, rest of Canada.

the difference between Quebec and the rest of the country here.¹¹ The full regression model is reported in Table 2. Rather than showing the raw probit coefficients, the table presents some more readily interpretable marginal change coefficients (with their associated standard errors). These results have roughly the same interpretation as a simple OLS coefficient. For instance,

being female increases the likelihood of saying that you belong completely to Canada by 3.6 per cent. Age has a stronger effect: in comparison with those aged under thirty-five, the likelihood of indicating a strong sense of belonging is fourteen per cent greater for those aged between thirty-five and fifty-four, and almost twenty-seven per cent greater for those aged fifty-five or older. Education, *ceteris paribus*, decreases the likelihood of indicating a strong sense of belonging to Canada. Results for demographics are roughly the same for belonging to province and town, although income, while insignificant in the first model, is significant and negative in the latter two.¹²

The coefficients of real interest are the series of dummy variables capturing the three-way interaction between racial-minority status, immigrant status and Quebec vs. the rest of Canada (or ROC in the tables). We also track these groups across generations, paying particular attention to the first (or immigrant) generation and the second generation (the Canadian-born children of immigrants). We refer to the three-plus generations as the 'settled' populations, producing a 'settled majority' population (the white population) and a 'settled minority' population (the racial-minority population). The residual category in the analysis is the settled majority population in the rest of Canada (that is, third-plus generation, majority ROC).

In the first column of Table 2, all coefficients are negative and statistically significant; the implication is that all groups exhibit less sense of belonging to Canada than does the settled white population outside Quebec. Coefficients are larger (that is, more negative) for groups within Quebec. Majority Quebecers clearly show lower levels of belonging (coefficients range from -0.164 to -0.360). Racial-minority immigrants in the province (1st Gen Minority Quebec) show only slightly lower levels of belonging (-0.068), but second-generation racial minorities in Quebec show markedly lower levels (-0.269). Results in subsequent columns are somewhat more variable: some groups exhibit higher levels of belonging to their province or town than do respondents from the settled white population in the rest of the country.¹³

The differences across groups are made somewhat clearer in Table 3, which shows predicted levels of belonging based on the models presented in Table 2. The table shows the estimated likelihood of respondents saying they belong 'very strongly' in Canada, their province and their city, town or municipality. It distinguishes between respondents in the rest of Canada in the first columns and respondents in Quebec in the remaining columns. For each of these two groups, columns distinguish between majority and minority respondents; within each of these columns, the rows show results for the first generation, second generation and third-plus generations. There is one gap: there are too few settled minority respondents in Quebec (i.e. third-plus generation racial minority) to support estimates for that group.¹⁴ This reflects the fact that the arrival of racial-minority immigrants is a more recent phenomenon in Quebec than in the rest of the country.

Let us begin by focusing on levels of belonging to Canada. Overall, these levels of belonging are higher in the rest of Canada than in Quebec. This can

Table 3. *Predicted levels of belonging among majority and minorities, Quebec and rest of Canada*

	<i>Rest of Canada</i>		<i>Quebec</i>	
	<i>Majority respondents</i>	<i>Minority respondents</i>	<i>Majority respondents</i>	<i>Minority respondents</i>
Belonging in Canada				
1st generation	0.628 (0.008)	0.623 (0.009)	0.537 (0.021)	0.631 (0.025)
2 nd generation	0.676 (0.005)	0.576 (0.011)	0.482 (0.015)	0.428 (0.032)
3 rd + generations	0.694 (0.005)	0.644 (0.029)	0.334 (0.009)	n/a
Belonging in province				
1st generation	0.354 (0.008)	0.426 (0.009)	0.352 (0.019)	0.413 (0.025)
2 nd generation	0.335 (0.005)	0.283 (0.011)	0.350 (0.014)	0.197 (0.028)
3 rd + generations	0.319 (0.004)	0.283 (0.028)	0.370 (0.009)	n/a
Belonging in town				
1st generation	0.298 (0.007)	0.385 (0.009)	0.292 (0.019)	0.399 (0.025)
2 nd generation	0.242 (0.005)	0.266 (0.011)	0.281 (0.013)	0.202 (0.028)
3 rd + generations	0.229 (0.005)	0.226 (0.025)	0.240 (0.008)	n/a

Cells contain predicted probabilities (of saying they belong completely) with standard errors in parentheses.

be seen most clearly in the large gap between the settled (labelled third-plus generations) majority population in the rest of Canada (0.694) and the settled majority population in Quebec (0.334). This is not surprising. The ambivalence of *les québécois* about the country is a central feature of Canadian politics, with roots that are deeply embedded in Canadian history.

For the present purposes, the key issue is the responses of immigrants. Let us focus first on racial-minority immigrants in the rest of Canada (their results are presented in the second column). In the rest of Canada, the measure of belonging for first-generation minority respondents (0.623) is almost the same as that for the settled majority population. Indeed, the two values – 0.623 and 0.628 – are not significantly different, statistically speaking. There is a modest drop for second-generation rest-of-Canada minority respondents (0.576), suggesting that the second generation may have greater ambivalence about the country. Critically, however, this does not seem to be the start of a downward

spiral. The sense of belonging recovers among settled minority Canadians (i.e. among third-plus-generation racial-minority respondents) in the country outside Quebec. Their figure (0.644) is only marginally lower than that for the settled majority population (0.694). In the case of white immigrants in the rest of Canada (results in the first column), the pattern of convergence is even smoother. First-generation white immigrants feel they belong almost as much as the settled majority population (0.628 compared with 0.694); and instead of a drop in attachment, the modest gap almost disappears in the second generation.

The shifts in Quebec are sharper. Again, let us start with racial minorities, in the fourth column. First-generation minority Quebecers are not very different from Canadians outside Quebec – the probability of belonging ‘very strongly’ is 0.631. But there is a sharp drop from the first to the second generation, from 0.631 to 0.428 – a much sharper fall than in the rest of Canada. Unfortunately, because there are so few settled minority respondents in Quebec (i.e. third-plus-generation racial minority), we cannot know whether this trend is likely to reverse, as in the rest of Canada, or to converge on the norm of majority Quebecers. The story for Quebec majority respondents may be telling, however. Majority immigrants (i.e. first-generation majority) have a 0.537 probability of saying that they belong strongly; second-generation white immigrants have a 0.482 probability; the long-settled population 0.334. So white immigrants to the province seem to be adopting the political ambivalence about Canada that prevails in the traditional *québécois* majority.

Interestingly, the patterns of belonging at the provincial and municipal level show less marked differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada. But the differences that do exist are intriguing. First, it is striking that settled majority Quebecers feel they belong ‘very strongly’ in Quebec only slightly more than in Canada – a probability of 0.370 compared with 0.334. Moreover, the difference between their provincial attachment and that of their counterparts in the rest of Canada is relatively small (0.370 vs. 0.319). Sharper differences emerge for racial minorities. First-generation minorities evidence a stronger sense of provincial belonging than the native-majority populations in both Quebec and the rest of Canada. But the identification drops significantly for second-generation racial-minority Quebecers. Provincial belonging drops for rest-of-Canada minorities as well, but the difference between the two second-generation groups is significant. That is, second-generation minorities feel a lower sense of belonging to their province than first-generation minorities, both in Quebec and in the rest of the country; but the value for Quebec minorities is significantly lower (at $p < 0.01$) than it is for rest-of-Canada minorities.

Sense of belonging is lower still for ‘city, town or municipality’, and declines steadily through first, second and third-or-more generations, both in Quebec and in the rest of Canada. Again, the sharpest decline is from first- to second-generation minority Quebecers.

Discussion and conclusions

Clearly, there are important differences in the sense of belonging in Quebec and the rest of Canada, a difference that is most marked in the case of racial minorities. While racial-minority immigrants in Quebec are indistinguishable on this measure from their counterparts in the rest of the country, the decline in the sense of belonging among the second generation is much sharper in Quebec. Moreover, the sharper decline in attachment to Canada is not offset by stronger attachment at the provincial or municipal level; indeed, as we have seen, the drop in belonging to province is sharper in Quebec than elsewhere. Second-generation racial minorities in Quebec seem less attached to all of the formal political communities in which they live. Because of the relatively recent nature of significant minority immigration into Quebec, we do not yet know whether the sense of belonging will strengthen again in succeeding generations, as in the rest of the country, or remain less marked.

How can we explain these patterns? A number of possible explanations can be discounted. First, differences in the sense of belonging are not explained by differences in the source countries from which immigrants came or by the mix among racial-minority immigrants across the country. The fact that the immigrant generation feels much the same across the country suggests strongly that the differences in the second generation reflect experiences in Canada rather than lingering effects from the countries of origin; additional controls for specific ethnic groups change the results very little. Second, we can discount the economic experience of immigrants in Canada. The economic integration of immigrants is, in fact, weaker in Quebec than in the rest of the country (Zietsma 2007; Nadeau and Secklin 2010). However, the differences in belonging shown earlier control for income, and separate analyses unreported here suggest that controlling directly for unemployment makes no difference. Third is the possibility that the ability to speak the language of the majority – French in Quebec or English in the rest of the country – is critical. However, language use is not behind our results. Our test of this possibility involved the addition of four variables: reported knowledge of French inside Quebec, French outside Quebec, English inside Quebec and English outside Quebec. Three of these variables are positive and significant, confirming the connection between language use and sense of belonging. However this is not the case for French in Quebec, where it has no effect.¹⁵ And the addition of these variables matters little for the rest of the model: adding controls for language use makes little difference to the coefficients for immigrant status. (Results available on request.) Finally, we can also discount the possibility that discrimination varies across regions. There is little evidence of this in the EDS: responses to questions on whether respondents had experienced discrimination are not vastly different between Quebec and the rest of Canada,¹⁶ and controlling for experienced discrimination also makes no difference to the estimates discussed earlier. Therefore, the origins of the differences are likely to lie elsewhere.

Clearly the competitive nation-building agendas directed towards the immigrant communities in Quebec, and the distinctive policy regimes that flow from the competition, is a prime candidate. The larger conflict over political identity is a feature of life in the province with little parallel in the rest of the country. In the introduction, we laid out four logical possibilities about the consequences for the sense of belonging:

1. Strong Canada / strong Quebec

The hypothesis that competitive nation-building leads to a comparably strong sense of attachment to both Canada and the province of Quebec is not borne out.

2. Strong Canada / weak Quebec

The hypothesis that Quebec nation-building is seen as more 'ethnic' and more exclusive than its Canadian counterpart, producing a stronger sense of attachment to Canada than to the province of Quebec, also does not find much support in our data. The decline in the sense of belonging to both Canada and province among second-generation racial minorities is sharper in Quebec than in the rest of the country. While the collapse is more dramatic in the case of attachment to the province than to Canada, it is hard to argue that racial-minority communities are binding themselves psychologically to Ottawa to defend them from Quebec City.

3. Weak Canada / strong Quebec

The sharper drop in the sense of belonging from the first to the second generation in Quebec might suggest that the immigrant community is absorbing the long-standing ambivalence about Canada among native Quebecers. In this interpretation, minority Quebecers are slowly adopting the nationalism of the province in an intergenerational evolution. The trend among white immigrants to Quebec might be seen as consistent with this interpretation, but the trend among racial minorities clearly is not. As already noted, the drop in attachment to province is sharper in Quebec than elsewhere in the country.

4. Weak Canada / weak Quebec

This is the hypothesis that seems to be most supported by the data. Racial-minority Quebecers, tugged between two conceptions of the country, feel less engaged in all of the domains in which they live. Confronted by a conflict that is not their own, they seem to withdraw, remaining less attached, less identified with the political communities of the country to which they have come.

Clearly, these judgements are provisional. The maturation of a third generation of racial minorities in Quebec will be critical. Will there be a rebound

in attachment to Canada as in the rest of the country? Will racial minorities overcome their detachment from the province, converging more fully onto Québécois nationalism? Or will minority communities remain torn between the two? The rival nation-building projects still have much to contest.

Notes

1 The authors wish to thank Alain-G. Gagnon, Raffaele Iacovino, Denise Helly, Will Kymlicka, Marie McAndrew, Alain Noël, Deanna Pikkov, Leslie Seidle and the two anonymous reviewers for insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article. The research was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

2 In Canada, Aboriginal communities also see themselves as distinct nations. However, this article does not incorporate this additional dimension of Canadian diversity.

3 The premier was widely criticised, including within the Parti Québécois, and resigned within days.

4 Some other provinces, such as British Columbia and Manitoba, also play a significant role in settlement programmes. Meanwhile, provinces are responsible for public services such as education that are also important to the long-term integration of immigrants and their families.

5 On the division of jurisdiction over immigration and immigrant integration, see Banting (2011); also Garcea (2006) and Dewing and Leman (2006).

6 For some analysts, the centrality of French is the only significant difference between interculturalism and multiculturalism. According to Daniel Salée, for example, 'there is no profound difference between Quebec's approach to diversity management and that of Canada' (Salée 2007: 116). His assessment is supported by a number of other commentators (McAndrew 2007; Blad and Couton 2009; Nugent 2006; Kymlicka 2001; Carens 1995).

7 Joseph Carens comments on one Quebec policy statement as follows: 'The authors are clearly committed to linking Quebec's distinct society and its nationalist project to a specific history and culture, but they want to do that without repudiating pluralism and democracy. They want to affirm a Quebec in which everyone is a full member, regardless of origin, and simultaneously one in which a particular culture holds a privileged place. This leads to a tortuous discussion in places' (Carens 1995: 69).

8 There might be other interpretations of such a possible outcome. One combines different factors: weak attachment to Canada might reflect the attenuated presence and visibility of the federal government in the province, whereas weak attachment to Quebec might reflect a sense that québécois nationalism is exclusionary. We thank Raffaele Iacovino for drawing this possibility to our attention. Alternatively, immigrants may simply move to Canada believing that it is a society of rights, and the obligation to integrate is comparatively low. While this is possible, such preferences cannot account for the differences we find between immigrants to Quebec and immigrants to the rest of Canada – unless, that is, immigrants feeling this way move more to Quebec than elsewhere, which seems unlikely.

9 The EDS did not include Aboriginal peoples, who represent four per cent of the total population.

10 For further details on the EDS, see *Ethnic Diversity Survey: Portrait of a Multicultural Society* (Statistics Canada, Catalogue no. 89-593-XIE).

11 One relatively simple test of inter-regional differences is to re-estimate the same models presented here, but comparing the three major census metropolitan areas (CMAs): Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. Doing so suggests that there are very few differences between Toronto and Vancouver; both are different from Montreal, however, at least for second- and third-generation results. Results are available upon request.

12 Note that income is the one variable here that is not binary. The variable ranges from 1 to 10, and so what seem to be relatively small coefficients can actually make quite a difference taking into account the entire range of income.

13 These results are in line with recent work on similar issues, using data from the Canadian Election Studies, by Bilodeau et al. (2010). These authors focus on first-generation immigrants and somewhat different measures of federal vs. provincial attachment. Even so, they find that first-generation immigrants in Quebec show higher levels of attachment to the federal (vs. the provincial) government than do other Quebec residents.

14 There were in fact twenty-one such respondents, but clearly these were too few to generate reliable results. These respondents were excluded from the estimations in Table 2, and thus here as well.

15 This finding is also consistent with recent results in Bilodeau et al. (2010), which indicate that first-generation English-speaking immigrants are more strongly attached to the federal than to the provincial government in Quebec, but that French-speaking immigrants are not.

16 Majority Quebec respondents are slightly more likely to say they have experienced discrimination than majority respondents elsewhere in the country. First-generation minority Quebec respondents are slightly less likely to report discrimination than their counterparts elsewhere; second-generation minority Quebec respondents report roughly the same level of discrimination as their counterparts in the rest of Canada.

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Appendix

Table A1 shows the sample size for each cohort.

All regression models used a binary probit estimation, where voting variables are coded as 1 for respondents saying they voted and 0 otherwise. Controls included the following:

- Gender: one binary variable equal to 1 for women and 0 for men.
- Age: two binary variables, equal to 1 for (a) those aged 35–54 years old or (b) those aged 55 and over. The residual category is those less than 35 years old.
- Education: one binary variable equal to 1 for those with more than a high-school diploma.
- Income: ten income groups, coded 1 to 10, where 1 is \$10,000 or less, 2 is \$10,001 to \$20,000 and so on, and 10 is \$100,000 or more.

In Table 2, the results from these regression models are shown as marginal changes in the probability that $y = 1$. As discussed in the text, belonging variables were collapsed from a five-point scale into a binary variable. Results of the belonging models were verified using both (a) an ordinal probit estimation with the five-category dependent variable and (b) an OLS model treating

the five-category responses as a simple interval-level variable. There were no substantive changes in results; all are available upon request.

Table A1. *Sample sizes*

	<i>ROC</i>		<i>Quebec</i>	
	<i>Majority</i>	<i>Minority</i>	<i>Majority</i>	<i>Minority</i>
Belonging in Canada				
1 st generation	4828	3829	777	496
2 nd generation	10,334	2818	1430	357
3 rd + generations	10,661	350	3693	21
Belonging in province				
1 st generation	4797	3802	774	494
2 nd generation	10,296	2812	1421	358
3 rd + generations	10,643	350	3690	21
Belonging in town				
1 st generation	4795	3799	772	496
2 nd generation	10,286	2811	1427	358
3 rd + generations	10,633	349	3682	21