

Ties That Bind?  
Social Cohesion and  
Diversity in Canada

**G**ROWING ETHNIC DIVERSITY HAS GENERATED TWO INTERSECTING POLICY AGENDAS IN Western democracies.<sup>1</sup> One agenda celebrates diversity. From this perspective, the most compelling challenges facing governments are to respect cultural differences, expand the room for minorities to express their distinctive cultures and construct new and more inclusive forms of citizenship. The second agenda focuses on social cohesion or social integration. From this perspective, the challenge before diverse societies is to reinforce the bonds of a common community. Here the need is to incorporate newcomers into the economic and social mainstream, to sustain a sense of mutual commitment or solidarity in times of need and to build a common national identity.

Both of these agendas are important in diverse societies, and there is no logical reason why they cannot be pursued simultaneously. Nevertheless, the historical record in Western democracies is that political attention shifts back and forth between these intersecting agendas. Throughout much of history, ethnic diversity was seen primarily as a threat to social and political order, and it was actively discouraged by the state. Immigrants, national minorities and indigenous peoples were subject to a wide range of policies designed to assimilate them into the dominant cultural community or to marginalize them. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, however, many Western democracies embraced a more accommodating approach to ethnic diversity, adopting a wide range of programs designed to extend some level of public recognition and support for ethnocultural minorities to maintain and express their distinct identities and practices. With a few notable exceptions, this more multiculturalist approach represented the dominant trend in Western democracies in the closing decades of the last century.

In the first decade of this new century, the balance of debate is shifting again. There is renewed concern about social integration in diverse societies. Historically, concern about integration tends to surface during periods of rapid social change, reflecting anxiety about the sources of social order and the avoidance of conflict. Many liberal democracies seem to be living through such a period now. In late 2005, riots and burning cars in Paris dramatized the failure to integrate the young from minority communities. A few weeks later, race riots broke out on Australia's beaches, raising questions about that country's reputation for peaceful multiculturalism. And then newspaper cartoons depicting Muhammad were published in Denmark and other European countries, sparking protests from Muslims around the world. In the spring of 2006, intense political battles were fought in the United States over immigration policy and the status of undocumented migrants, prompting marches by migrants and their supporters across the country. In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that commentators worry about the integration of minority communities into the mainstream of economic and social life.

While demonstrations and violent clashes provide the most dramatic evidence of tension, other commentators point to a quieter erosion of social integration in the face of diversity. In the United States, Samuel Huntington asks "Who are we?" and worries that American national unity is threatened by immigration and the twin "cults" of multiculturalism and diversity (2004). In the Netherlands, and elsewhere in Europe, critics of multiculturalism insist that illiberal and intolerant strands within some minority communities are going unchallenged, weakening commitments to such values as gender equality and tolerance for diverse sexual preferences.<sup>2</sup> In Britain, some analysts worry that the celebration of difference is corroding the social solidarity that underpins the welfare state, contributing to a slow decline in the redistributive role of the state (Goodhart 2004); and even some spokespersons for British minorities argue that an emphasis on respecting their cultural difference has diverted attention from solving their economic and social problems.<sup>3</sup>

The integrationist momentum has been further reinforced by the new salience of the security agenda since 9/11. In Europe, for example, concern has been intensified by the emergence of radical elements within the Muslim community in some European cities, the murder of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands and bombings in London by young Muslim men born and raised in

the United Kingdom. The worry is that an emphasis on multiculturalism and respect for diversity has unintentionally created space for radical religious and political movements intent on attacking the liberal-democratic order.

These trends are reshaping political debates, shifting priority to social integration. In the United States, members of an “official English” movement and others have sought to roll back accommodations for immigrants established in earlier decades (Hero and Preuhs 2006; Citrin et al. 1990). In Europe, governments increasingly converge on a model of civic integration that emphasizes the need of immigrants to adopt the language, norms and culture of the receiving country (see Christian Joppke’s chapter in this volume; Entzinger 2006). Knowledgeable analysts write about a “retreat from multiculturalism” (Joppke 2004), and “the return of assimilation” (Brubaker 2001). A closer look often reveals that governments are less involved in dismantling multicultural programs than they are in supplementing them with nation-building or integrationist measures (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). At a minimum, however, a shift in policy discourse is under way.

Until recently, these debates have had limited resonance in Canada, and Canadians have often been puzzled by the intensity of debates elsewhere. Core policies on immigration and multiculturalism have enjoyed substantial political consensus, and occasional challengers have gained little traction in political debates. To be sure, Canada faces its own crises of integration. However, these have flowed from tensions among the historic or founding peoples of the country, as evidenced by the near-death experience of the referendum on Quebec separation in 1995 and clashes between Aboriginal people and the wider society. In contrast, the integration of new Canadians has seemed to be a success story, and most debate has continued to focus on fostering respect for minority differences rather than the erosion of the ties that bind.

But cracks in Canadian equanimity seem to be appearing. Recent cohorts of immigrants have fared less well in the labour market, despite having higher levels of education and training than their predecessors. Evidence of greater residential segregation is emerging in some of our cities. The emergence of gang-related violence in some cities and the arrest of a number of second-generation immigrant men in Toronto on suspicion of plotting terrorist acts are disquieting. And the sharp debate about the role of Sharia law in Ontario has demonstrated how quickly flashpoints can emerge. These warning signals, together with the

images of sectarian tension in other countries flashing across our television screens, have raised questions about social integration here as well. For example, on the basis of a survey of tensions in other countries, Allan Gregg argues that Canadians have no reason to be complacent, asserting that “as is the case in England, France, and other advanced liberal democracies, national unity in Canada is increasingly threatened by the growing atomization of our society along ethnic lines” (Gregg 2006, 4; see also Bennett-Jones 2005).

Do Canadians really have reason to worry about social cohesion? Clearly, the historic divisions among the founding peoples continue to pose powerful challenges. But is immigration creating new fault lines in the terrain of Canadian life? If a nation is an imagined community, is there evidence that newcomers are not integrated into the imagined community we call Canada? In this chapter, we seek to shed light on these questions by exploring differences across ethnic and religious groups in a variety of sensitive social linkages, including a sense of pride and belonging in Canada, levels of interpersonal trust, the balance between liberal and socially conservative values, the extent of engagement in social networks that bridge cultural divides and participation in electoral processes.

In conducting this analysis, we draw on two opinion surveys. We rely primarily on the second wave of the “Equality, Security and Community Survey” (ESCS), conducted in Canada in 2002-03. This survey is strong on measures of pride, belonging, trust, associational memberships and voting. It is weak, however, on social values. For these, we rely on the 2004 Canadian Election Study (CES).<sup>4</sup>

In the next two sections, we explore our understanding of the core ideas of diversity on the one side and social cohesion or integration on the other. We consider the meanings of these two terms and introduce the survey variables we use to capture them. Then we present our analyses and consider their implications. To anticipate, all of our dependent variables show important differences across ethnic groups, and in some cases across religious groups as well. But only part of the ethnic difference is the product of ethnicity per se. Much of the apparent difference is driven by the fact that many members of many ethnic minorities are first-generation immigrants. The differences between immigrant and native-born Canadians narrow considerably the longer newcomers are in Canada. While time does not eliminate all of the differences between newcomers and native-born Canadians, as we shall see, the impact is substantial. Indeed, the largest challenges to social cohesion in Canada remain rooted not in the attitudes, beliefs and

attachments of relative newcomers but in the historic fault lines between the oldest nations that make up this country.

## What Forms of Diversity?

WE START WITH ETHNICITY, THE MOST COMMON CATEGORY IN THE DIVERSITY debate. Here, we define ethnicity in terms of national ancestry and refer to the founding peoples of Canada as well as more recent newcomers. We therefore group Canadians into eight categories: Aboriginal people; French; British and northern European (from Austria, Germany, the Benelux countries and Scandinavia); Eastern European; southern European; South Asian (plus Middle Eastern); East Asian; and Caribbean and African. The choice of categories is driven by our sense of the relative salience of ethnic differences, tempered by data limitations.<sup>5</sup> The combination of South Asian and Middle Eastern exemplifies the latter — there are too few people claiming a Middle Eastern background to stand as an independent group, but exploratory work indicated that they did not belong with the reference category. As it stands, we are skating close to the statistical edge for some of the groups.

Throughout the analysis that follows, the British/northern European group stands as the reference category or comparison group (but see the further refinement in note 7), not because it is seen as more representative of Canada than any other component of the population but because it is the largest group.<sup>6</sup> Because the attitudes of Quebec francophones and French Canadians outside of Quebec often differ on such issues as national identity and feelings about Canada generally, we must represent both ethno-linguistic identity and province of residence. We do so by focusing on Quebec francophones.<sup>7</sup>

Recent debate also features a religious dimension. Much of it centres on Islam, of course. But it is useful to bear in mind that religious diversity is an important feature of historically mainstream ethnic groups, and the *Constitution Act, 1867* recognizes religious diversity as well as linguistic variation. Recently, these religious differences have become more politically salient. Evangelical Protestants among old and new Canadians have been a target for conservative mobilization, as are practising Catholics and non-Christian groups perceived to be traditional-minded on

sexuality and the place of women in society. Hence we compare Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists. For some of these groups, again, the numbers are small. For Catholics and Protestants, we further distinguish those who say religion is important in their lives from those who do not. The reference category in this case is people with no religious identification.

Although our substantive interest is primarily in ethnic diversity and secondarily in religious orientation, we also include controls, with the result that differences that initially appear as ethnic in nature sometimes turn out to reflect other factors. Most critical is a complex of three demographic factors: immigrant status (that is, whether the respondent is an immigrant or Canadian-born); for immigrants, the number of years of residence in Canada; and, finally, the respondent's age. In our set-up, the first variable contrasts native-born Canadians with immigrants who have just arrived; the second captures the extent to which immigrants' attitudes change as they remain in Canada. But age is a necessary further control, as it is potentially a confounding factor: the number of years in Canada is correlated with age, and it may only indicate age effects by the back door. Controlling for age also allows us to unpack the native-born community.

Finally, we also look for a second-generation effect. In the case of the estimations based on the ESCS (but not the CES), we identify second-generation members of immigrant communities — the children of immigrants — to gauge the extent that differences in immigrants' beliefs and behaviour persist in the second generation. Essentially, we find very limited distinctiveness for such Canadians. To the extent that recency of arrival produces ostensible ethnic differences, our data suggest that it is a story primarily of the first generation. Accordingly, we do not highlight these results in the figures, but interested readers can find the details in appendix 2. We do, however, summarize our findings on the second generation at the end of our general discussion.

## W H A T I S S O C I A L C O H E S I O N ?

**T**HEORIES OF THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL COHESION ARE AS OLD AS THE SOCIAL SCIENCES themselves. Indeed, Émile Durkheim insisted in the 1880s that the core question facing the emerging discipline of sociology was, "What are the bonds

which unite men one with another?" (cited in Lukes 1973, 139). In the contemporary era, three distinct approaches to Durkheim's question command attention. The first approach sees social cohesion as being rooted fundamentally in a common body of norms and shared values, or what Durkheim himself called a "collective conscience." From this perspective, a society cannot endure without a common body of norms adhered to by most people, and this collective conscience is especially critical when members of a society are called upon to make sacrifices for the common good. This Durkheimian tradition continues to resonate in contemporary debates. The assertion that shared values underpin the unity of the country is perennial in Canadian politics; and an emphasis on common values, especially the value of gender equality, fuelled recent controversy about Sharia law in Ontario and elsewhere. However, the main focus in this tradition is the concept of national identity. Here the essential question is "Who are we?" Many analysts have argued that a common sense of identity is critical to the capacity of a society to undertake collective endeavours and to sustain itself over time. This view has emerged, for example, in recent debates about the relationship between ethnic diversity and the welfare state. A number of analysts have suggested that redistribution is much easier in homogeneous communities, and that ethnic diversity weakens the willingness of the cultural majority to redistribute resources to newcomers they see as "others." Political theorists such as David Miller reply, however, that ethnic diversity is problematic only if governments fail to implement policies that nurture a common sense of national identity (1995, 2000).

A second approach to social cohesion places much less emphasis on shared values and identities and argues that widespread engagement and participation are the keys to social integration. Here the key question is not "Who are we?" but rather "How are we to live together?" Analysts in this tradition insist that there is no return to some distant past of normative consensus, if such a past ever existed. Contemporary societies are characterized by multiple identities and diverse values, and they cannot hope to find the wellspring of cohesion in common attitudes. According to this perspective, however, a society can function perfectly adequately as long as there is a general consensus on the institutions and procedures through which tensions can be mediated and conflicts adjudicated (Berger 1998). In democratic countries, this essential minimum centres on the institutions of liberal democracy and the political values on which they rest (see Will Kymlicka's chapter in this volume; Bauböck 2003).

Other analysts extend this approach, arguing that the key to social cohesion is the active engagement of diverse groups in a society and in debates about that society's future. Here the priorities are to ensure that different identities are recognized as legitimate, that newcomers are incorporated in the economy, that citizens bring their diverse values and identities into the political life and that all groups engage in the political institutions that manage the tensions inherent in modern diversity. Thus, when Jane Jenson breaks the concept of social cohesion into constituent units, shared values and a common political identity are noticeably absent. In her world, the key dimensions are belonging versus isolation, inclusion versus exclusion, participation versus noninvolvement, recognition versus rejection and legitimacy versus illegitimacy (1998).

These two approaches do not exhaust contemporary usage. A third approach is taken by analysts who equate social cohesion with social capital, represented by social networks and norms of trust (Osberg 2003; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2001). The idea of social capital has captured the imaginations of many scholars in recent years, and a large volume of research has asserted its importance. One strand of the rapidly growing literature assures us that interpersonal trust fosters cooperation among people and facilitates collective action, with powerful implications for economic, cultural and political life (Putnam 1995, 2000, 2004; Uslaner 2002). Given the wide range of social benefits associated with trust, it is not surprising that the apparent decline in levels of trust has set off alarm bells, especially in the United States. From the perspective of this chapter, it is important that a number of analysts have concluded that ethnic diversity is one factor eroding interpersonal trust in that country (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). A second strand in this literature celebrates the importance of membership in civic associations. For Robert Putnam, trust is an asset that grows with use, and participation in associations builds interpersonal trust because it encourages interaction (1995, 2000). However, not all memberships are created equal, and Putnam distinguishes between bonding groups, which bring people of the same cultural background together, and bridging groups, which span cultural divides. Much would therefore seem to depend on the balance between bridging and bonding in increasingly diverse societies.<sup>8</sup>

Clearly, the concept of social cohesion or integration admits of multiple understandings, and much depends on the conception of the sources of integration that prevail in public discourse, both for the interpretation of the problems

facing us and for the policy responses to them. Part of the underlying shift in the Netherlands, for example, turned on this issue: “More than before, immigrant integration appears to be defined in terms of their loyalties to and identification with ‘Dutch values and norms,’ rather than in terms of their social and institutional participation” (Entzinger 2006, 186).

From our perspective, however, there is no reason to choose definitively between these views at the outset. The various approaches point to different dimensions of solidarity and the need for a multi-indicator approach to its analysis (Friedkin 2004). This chapter therefore draws from all three conceptions to identify a set of attitudes and behaviours for examination. In the concluding section, we return to the different theories of the sources of social cohesion and reflect on their distinct implications for Canada.

In exploring social cohesion in Canada, we examine six types of dependent variable. The first two relate to a sense of national identity; the second two tap social values and attitudes; and the last two measure forms of social and political participation (see appendix 1 for exact question wording):

1. *Pride in country*. Pride in one’s country is surely an important indication of cohesion and solidarity. Here we examine whether individuals responded “very proud” to the simple but telling question “How proud are you to be Canadian?”<sup>9</sup>
2. *Sense of belonging*. Here we look at whether respondents feel they belong completely in Canada (that is, scoring themselves 10 on a scale of 1 to 10).<sup>10</sup> Sense of belonging is a more complicated matter than pride. It turns not just on how much the person wants to be part of the place but also on how well accepted that person is by other denizens of the place.
3. *Interpersonal trust*. Trust plays a central role in the social capital literature. Some analysts distinguish between generalized trust, reflecting a conviction that most people can be trusted most of the time, and a more strategic or specific trust, rooted in personal experience and specific to the nature of the event and the people whose trustworthiness is being evaluated (Uslaner 2002; Soroka, Helliwell, and Johnston 2006). We examine measures of both forms of trust. Generalized trust is measured through the standard question in the literature, which asks respondents whether in general people can be trusted. Strategic trust is measured through a “wallet question,” which taps whether respondents believe

that a lost wallet or purse would be returned with the money in it.

4. *Social values.* As we mentioned earlier, analysts in some European societies fear that new waves of immigrants are bringing illiberal values with them, potentially weakening a public consensus in support of norms such as gender equality and tolerance for diverse sexual preferences. Obviously, there is no such thing as Canadian values in the sense of values that are shared so widely and deeply as to constitute some essentialist definition of Canadianness. Both native-born Canadians and immigrants are divided on issues related to the role of women in society and sexual preferences. Our interest here is simply whether there are significant differences in the balance of values among ethnic communities in Canada. We use the 2004 CES and focus on whether respondents agreed that society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children and that gays and lesbians should be allowed to marry.
5. *Social networks.* Participation in social networks is a form of engagement highlighted in the social capital literature that is seen as playing a potentially important role in the bridging of different ethnic communities and the integration of immigrant groups. Following Putnam (2004), we distinguish between bonding groups, which bring together people of the same ethnicity, and bridging groups, which span ethnic divides. Our own past work with the ESC survey suggests a difference between religious and ethnic groups, which are more clearly bonding, and groups that are more likely to be bridging (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2005). Bridging groups are more important in building interpersonal trust, and they are likely more important in facilitating the incorporation of newcomers into a society. Accordingly, we focus on membership in these bridging groups — specifically, membership in any one of the following: service clubs, recreational groups, political groups, youth-oriented groups and groups providing cultural services.<sup>11</sup>
6. *Voting.* Finally, we turn to voting, the most elemental form of political engagement in a democratic society. Voting is not the only means of participating in democratic politics, and the pluralist nature of Canadian politics opens up many avenues for groups and movements engaged in political action and advocacy. Nevertheless, the vote remains central to democratic politics. We therefore examine whether members of

different ethnic groups report that they exercise the franchise in equal measure. In this case, of course, the sample of respondents is narrowed to those people who are eligible to vote by virtue of being citizens, either by birth or by naturalization, and being 18 years of age or older.<sup>12</sup>

### The Data: Social Cohesion across Ethnic and Religious Groups

OUR PRIMARY INDICATOR OF DIVERSITY IS ETHNICITY, AND WE FOLLOW THE SAME stages for each of our six indicators of social cohesion. The first step is to focus on the mean probability of each individual, by ethnicity, affirming the high-cohesion value — for instance, expressing pride in Canada. This is indicated by the top (black) bar in the set of horizontal bars for each ethnic group in figures 1 through 8. These bars indicate the magnitude and direction of each ethnic group's response relative to the comparison group, and the top bar in each group's set therefore describes the landscape of ostensible ethnic differences.

The remaining steps introduce an increasing number of controls, adding them to the analysis, one group of controls at a time. The second step controls for the most obvious correlate of ethnicity — immigration. The controls at this stage have three components: whether the respondent is an immigrant or native-born; for immigrants, the duration of residence in Canada; and, for native-born, whether at least one parent was born abroad. To the extent that a group's distinctiveness reflects the relative recency of its members' arrival in the country (rather than ethnicity *per se*), these controls should push the difference between it and the comparison group toward zero. The third step adds a control for age as a further check on the residence effect and as a factor in its own right. The fourth and final step introduces religious controls to see if a given group's apparent distinctiveness really reflects its religious centre of gravity. Each of these steps is represented by a subsequent bar in figures 1 through 8.

Probability differences in the figures are calculated from binary probit estimations; the detailed estimations appear as tables in appendix 2. However, in the text we focus primarily on the factors most relevant to ethnic differences, which are captured in the figures that follow.


*Identity: Pride and Belonging.* Figures 1 and 2 tap various dimensions of the extent to which members of different ethnic groups identify with the country and see themselves as part of the imagined community called Canada.

Figure 1 is in many ways paradigmatic, and it therefore bears description in some detail. We start with the solid black bars at the top of each ethnic group's block of bars. For each group but two — southern Europeans and people from South Asia and the Middle East — the direction of this solid black bar is negative: other groups are less likely to express pride in Canada than British/northern European respondents do. Only for Quebec francophones and East Asians is the difference clear and statistically significant by the usual test and criterion. People of Caribbean and African heritage are also less closely identified with the country — the difference is smaller, but significant nonetheless. This is indicated by the bar's size relative to the 95 percent confidence interval, labelled "significant."<sup>13</sup>

The first stage of controls tells most of the rest of the story. Once immigrant status and duration of stay are controlled, the new Canadian groups cease to be distinct, and in some cases they even reverse their relative positions. East Asians, who initially appeared less committed to Canada, become, in effect, just like the reference group. Caribbean/African Canadians shift from being relatively alienated to relatively enthusiastic about the country. South Asians emerge as the most proud of the country, relatively speaking. In contrast, the ambivalence about the country within its two oldest communities, Aboriginal people and francophone Quebecers, is relatively unaffected by immigration controls. Indeed, when immigration status is controlled, these groups turn out to be even less proud of Canada. In general, newcomers from other parts of the world are prouder to be Canadian than the reference group.<sup>14</sup>

Figure 2, which focuses on a sense of belonging, provides a somewhat less rosy picture. Results indicate that all groups feel less "belonging" in Canada than do British/northern European respondents, though clearly to varying degrees. We should not lose sight of the fact that on a 10-point scale of belonging, the median response for every group is 8 or above. We find no group that clearly feels it does not belong. Even so, there are differences in individuals' propensity to say they "belong completely." In many particulars, these differences echo figure 1. While the distinctiveness of francophone Quebecers and Aboriginal people is not affected by immigration, immigration does play a big role in explaining the


## Pride in Canada, by Ethnicity, Adding Cumulative Controls



Source: Calculations by the authors, based on "Equality, Security and Community Survey" (2002-03), wave II.

Note: Comparison category is British/northern European/francophones outside Quebec (see p. 5).

### Belonging in Canada, by Ethnicity, Adding Cumulative Controls



Source: Calculations by the authors, based on "Equality, Security and Community Survey" (2002-03), wave II.

Note: Comparison category is British/northern European/francophones outside Quebec (see p. 5).


apparent distinctiveness of the newer groups, exactly as before. Here, the apparent ethnic difference is nearly halved once immigration status is taken into account. But even with controls, *all* distinct groups feel a weaker sense of belonging than British and northern European respondents, and this is especially true among visible minority newcomers. This reminds us that belonging is different from pride. It is not just about the new groups — witness the position of Aboriginal people and francophone Quebecers. But it is clearly about an aspect of the relationships among groups. If time in the country increases the sense of belonging for new Canadians, gaps do not close completely.

*Shared Values: Interpersonal Trust and Social Values.* Figures 3 to 6 examine the extent to which important attitudes and values are shared by Canadians of all ethnicities. Figures 3 and 4 present two measures of trust and can be discussed together. The results here are somewhat sobering. Every group is less trusting than the British/northern European group. Moreover, the impact of controls is generally weak. In this domain, the length of time newcomers have been in Canada does not have as dramatic an impact as in other areas.

These findings are in line with other work on ethnic differences in interpersonal trust, within Canada and cross-nationally. Research suggests that income and education, as well as contextual factors such as ethnic diversity, can affect both generalized and strategic trust (for example, Glaeser et al. 2000; Soroka, Helliwell, and Johnston 2006). To the extent that these factors co-vary with ethnicity, they may account for part of the interethnic difference. Much of the variance in trust across ethnic groups remains unaccounted for, however. Eric Uslaner argues that the generalized trust question captures a predisposition that is mainly moralistic, rooted in our beliefs about others rather than actual experience (2002). The stability of trust responses over time and across ethnic groups supports this notion, though actually explaining the differing levels of trust across ethnic groups clearly requires further study. The extent to which trust bears on various social or political outcomes is, of course, another question — where support for redistribution is concerned, for instance, our own work suggests that the link is rather weak (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2004). Regardless, trust is one dimension of social cohesion where significant and durable ethnic differences are apparent.


The pattern is quite different in the case of social values, as indicated by support for same-sex marriage and for women staying at home. These appear in figures 5 and 6. The outstanding fact about both indicators is that differences are weak: the

### Generalized Trust, by Ethnicity, Adding Cumulative Controls



Source: Calculations by the authors, based on "Equality, Security and Community Survey" (2002-03), wave II.  
Note: Comparison category is British/northern European/francophones outside Quebec (see p. 5).


Strategic Trust, Wallet Measure, by Ethnicity, Adding Cumulative Controls



Source: Calculations by the authors, based on "Equality, Security and Community Survey" (2002-03), wave II.


Note: Comparison category is British/northern European/francophones outside Quebec (see p. 5).

### Support for Gay Marriage, by Ethnicity, Adding Cumulative Controls



Source: Calculations by the authors, based on "Canadian Election Study" (2004). The data do not distinguish Aboriginal Canadians.  
 Note: Comparison category is British/northern European/francophones outside Quebec (see p. 5).

### Support for Women Staying at Home, by Ethnicity, Adding Cumulative Controls



Source: Calculations by the authors, based on "Canadian Election Study" (2004). The data do not distinguish Aboriginal Canadians.  
 Note: Comparison category is British/northern European/francophones outside Quebec (see p. 5).


(horizontal) range of effects is narrow, and only one probability difference is significant, statistically speaking. To the extent that findings are interpretable, they suggest the following: Quebec francophones are the most supportive of same-sex marriage. New groups are the least supportive. For such groups, however, the pattern is almost completely explained by recency of arrival.<sup>15</sup> Differences over the place of women have a similar structure, except among Quebec francophones, who are no longer the distinctively liberal group (here their views are the same as the British/northern Europeans), and among southern and Eastern Europeans. Controls do not, in general, make these groups less distinct. Despite these complexities, the central message is clear. Differences in social values are weak and statistically insignificant. The arrival of newcomers is not tipping the balance of attitudes in the country on fundamental questions of equality rights.

*Participation: Networks and Voting.* While the evidence on identities and on values points in different directions, our indicators of participation in social and political life point in a consistent direction. For membership in bridging groups (figure 7), differences are weak as compared with other indicators of cohesion. For the few new ethnic groups that tend to underparticipate, the big story is immigration: once immigration factors are controlled, most of the group differences collapse. No such collapse occurs among Quebec francophones or among Aboriginal Canadians, but even here, none of the differences is statistically significant.

The pattern in voting is basically similar (figure 8). As noted earlier, the sample of respondents here is restricted to those eligible to vote by virtue of holding citizenship and being at least 18 years of age. Differences that appear important in the first instance largely disappear when one controls for the length of time in Canada (for immigrants) and for age (all respondents). None of this should be surprising, since we know that turning out to vote is influenced by age for Canadians in general, and that younger generations in particular appear to be voting less. When these factors are taken into account, only the Aboriginal respondents stand out as less likely to vote.

Before turning to a wider discussion of these results, it is worth adding a word about second-generation effects, which are presented in the tables in appendix 2. Traditionally, Canadians have believed that while immigrants might retain distinctive views as a legacy of their homelands, the second generation — the children of those immigrants — tend overwhelmingly to adopt the attitudes of


### Membership in Bridging Groups, by Ethnicity, Adding Cumulative Controls



Source: Calculations by the authors, based on "Equality, Security and Community Survey" (2002-03), wave II.

Note: Comparison category is British/northern European/francophones outside Quebec (see p. 5).

Reported Turnout in  
2000 Election, by  
Ethnicity, Adding  
Cumulative Controls



Source: Calculations by the authors, based on "Equality, Security and Community Survey" (2002-03), wave II.  
Note: Comparison category is British/northern European/francophones outside Quebec (see p. 5).

the country of their birth. Our evidence necessitates only a partial modification of this picture. As we have seen, over time, the values and attitudes of newcomers do increasingly resemble those of the reference group, although the gap does not completely disappear.<sup>16</sup> In the case of the second generation, the evidence from coefficients in the tables points in similar directions. In the estimations related to sense of identity (pride in Canada and belonging in Canada), this coefficient is essentially null, signalling no significant difference from the reference group. In the two estimations related to trust, there are hints of persistent second-generation differences. In the case of the specific trust measured by the wallet question, it seems clear that the second generation is less trusting, less so even than first-generation immigrants. But with the two measures of engagement in Canadian life, the evidence tips back to an integrative pattern. In the case of participation in bridging groups, second-generation Canadians participate more, *ceteris paribus*, than older Canadians do; and in the case of voting, we find no difference from the reference group.

## Discussion and Conclusions

WHAT DO OUR RESULTS SUGGEST ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVERSITY and social cohesion? Our evidence points to important differences across ethnic groups for several indicators of social cohesion, and it would certainly be possible to paint an alarming picture by focusing only on the top black bars in the figures. Nevertheless, for all the complexities inherent in the analysis, we should not lose sight of one basic fact. With the exception of our measures of trust, and to a lesser extent of belonging, ethnic differences between newcomers and our reference group — British/northern Europeans — are relatively weak to begin with. Moreover, differences associated with groups of relatively recent arrival are a product of exactly that: recent arrival. For immigrant Canadians, it is the length of time in Canada that drives what at first glance appear to be strong ethnic differences. The longer new immigrants are in Canada, the more their sense of pride and, to a lesser extent, of belonging comes to equal or exceed that of the largest ethnic group. Thus, the integrative power of Canadian life for newcomers is impressive.

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There are limits to the integrative power of time, to be sure. Although newcomers from southern and Eastern Europe eventually come to feel they belong almost as much as those with ancestry in the United Kingdom and northern Europe, racially distinct minorities remain less confident that they fully belong. And, of course, the groups that are the least integrated are, as often as not, the ones that have been here longest — two of the founding peoples of the country. National unity thus remains problematic, but it is not ethnic groups of recent vintage that pose the primary challenge.

What can we conclude, then, about diversity and social cohesion in this country as a whole, incorporating both new and old Canadians? At the outset, we outlined different theories of the sources of social cohesion in modern societies, two of which seem especially relevant here. The first theory assumes that real social cohesion is built on the foundation of a common national identity and shared social values. The second theory assumes that we cannot rely on shared identity and values to hold together our increasingly diverse societies, but that inclusive patterns of engagement and participation can build social cohesion and help societies manage diversity. Viewing our findings through the dual lens of these interpretations produces different pictures of the prospects and challenges of social cohesion in Canada.

A conception of social cohesion as rooted in a common identity and shared values highlights the enduring challenges facing Canada. Many newcomers may be proud of Canada — prouder even than people who trace their ancestry to the United Kingdom and northern Europe. But Quebec francophones and arguably Aboriginal people remain ambivalent about the country for reasons deeply embedded in Canadian history. And while all groups score high on the belonging scale, intergroup differences in belonging show the same pattern as pride, though more strongly. Here, Quebec francophones are significantly less attached to Canada (in terms of both the pride and belonging measures) than others. They are joined by racially distinct newcomers, who are also less sure of their place here.

Shared attitudes and values are only slightly less problematic. As we have seen, there are persistent ethnic differences in the levels of trust Canadians have in each other. Generalized interpersonal trust is not affected by time in Canada, lending further support to Uslaner's thesis (2002) that this form of trust is essentially moralistic — culture-bound, bred into individuals at a young age and essentially unchanging over time. Even our wallet question, which measures a more

strategic version of trust, shows robust interethnic differences. However, there are virtually no differences in the balance of liberal and conservative social values across ethnic groups in Canada. The Canadian experience may in this case contrast sharply with that of some European countries, where critics of diversity worry that new minorities are injecting illiberal values into their culture. Here, in fully controlled models of support for either women staying home or gay marriage, there are very few significant differences across ethnic groups.

In sum, however, if social cohesion is well rooted only in a common sense of national identity and shared values, then Canada faces enduring challenges, especially in integrating its historic communities. The issues here have been addressed over the years by many commentators, and we can only underscore their continuing centrality to Canadian life. Crafting effective policy responses is a subtle art, since nurturing a common identity and shared values is problematic in a multination, multicultural country. We have already handed out a lot of Maple Leaf flags. Indeed, seeking to build a single, overarching sense of identity may well be counterproductive; in the case of the relationship between Canada and francophone Quebec, the most feasible strategy is probably to try to strengthen the sense of attachment to a Canada that incorporates distinctive identities.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, this thinner sense of a Canadian culture among the historic communities may actually have benefits in a multicultural era, making it easier for new Canadians to feel comfortable here. In the final analysis, however, faith in the future of Canada as a single state assumes that the first theory of social cohesion, with its emphasis on common national identity and shared values, is simply too narrow to capture the social realities and potential of the modern world.

The second conception of social cohesion generates a more optimistic view of Canada's prospects. Our measures of engagement in the social and political life of the country find virtually no significant differences across ethnic communities. Membership in groups that are likely to bridge social backgrounds does not differ across ethnic communities; and initial differences in the probability of voting collapse when controls are added (with a partial exception in the case of Aboriginal people). If the true source of social cohesion in today's multicultural world is to be found in the engagement of ethnic groups in community life and in the democratic processes through which we manage our diverse identities and values, then Canada seems to be reasonably positioned for the future. Moreover, this conception of social cohesion generates a policy agenda that can be reasonably tackled

within Canadian political life — an agenda of removing the remaining barriers to political participation and of strengthening the effectiveness of democratic institutions and accountability (see Will Kymlicka's chapter in this volume).

We end, therefore, on a note of restrained optimism. For newcomers, we find little evidence of vast, enduring ethnic differences across a variety of social cohesion indicators. With the exception of trust and, for some visible minorities, belonging, commonalities outweigh differences. Recency of arrival certainly matters, but this is simply a question of time. These findings should not, however, be seen as sounding an all-clear. The remaining differences across newer ethnic groups underscore the continued importance of our multicultural strategies. Strengthening the sense of belonging among visible minority immigrants, for example, will undoubtedly be a big challenge. Moreover, the greater difficulty experienced by recent cohorts of immigrants in entering the labour force is worrisome, and it has the potential to blunt wider forms of social and political participation. The fact that integrative processes have worked in the past is no guarantee that they will work as well in the future. Nevertheless, our findings do forestall hyperbole about the problems we face. They also stand as a warning against importing evidence from Europe or the United States and assuming it applies equally well in Canada. In the case of immigrant minorities, our findings do not justify fears that they threaten social cohesion.

On the field of identity, the fundamental divisions are not “new” Canadians versus “old” ones but within the ranks of the old. Quebec francophones and Aboriginal Canadians have a weaker sense of pride and belonging in Canada as a whole. These divisions are clearly not fading with time. They are as old as the country and deeply embedded in who we are as a people. It is not surprising that these founding peoples, who have come to see themselves as distinct peoples or nations within a multination state, do not exhibit as unqualified an identification or sense of belonging as others do. Indeed, it would be remarkable if Quebec francophones and Aboriginal people ever came to exhibit the degree of these orientations that new Canadians are likely to, for the latter have an affinity with Canada that is essentially elective. So far, at least, the country seems to be successfully facing the challenges of postmodernity. The bigger challenges stem from its premodern phase.

## D e p e n d e n t   V a r i a b l e s , Q u e s t i o n   W o r d i n g

### Pride in Canada (ESCS)

- ◆ “How proud are you to be Canadian: very proud, quite proud, not very proud, or not at all proud?”

### Belonging (ESCS)

- ◆ “Using a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means you feel like you do not belong at all and 10 means you feel that you belong completely, what number best describes how you feel about Canada?”

### Trust (ESCS)

- ◆ Generalized trust: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?”
- ◆ Strategic trust: “If you lost a wallet (or purse) that contained \$200, how likely is it to be returned with the money in it if it was found...would you say very likely, somewhat likely, or not at all likely?” Our measure combines the following four responses: “...by someone who lives close by”; “...by a clerk at the nearest grocery store”; “...by a police officer”; “...by a complete stranger.”

### “Bridging” Memberships (ESCS)

- ◆ “I am going to read a list of different types of groups and organizations. For each of them, I would like you to tell me how many groups of that type, if any, you are a member of.”
- ◆ “How many service clubs, such as the Lions Club or Meals on Wheels, do you belong to?”
- ◆ “How many recreational groups, such as sports leagues or clubs, music or hobby clubs, or exercise classes are you involved in?”
- ◆ “How many organizations active on political issues, such as the environment or taxpayers’ rights, do you belong to?”
- ◆ “Sometimes people give time to various types of organizations. How many youth-oriented groups, such as Girl Guides or minor hockey, have you volunteered time to in the last 12 months?”

- ◆ “How about organizations providing cultural services to the public, such as a museum or music festival. How many of these have you volunteered time to in the last 12 months?”
- ◆ “How about organizations that help people, such as the Cancer Society or a food bank? How many of these have you volunteered time to in the last 12 months?”

#### Charter Values (CES)

- ◆ “Society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?”
- ◆ “Gays and lesbians should be allowed to get married. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?”

## 2A. Pride in Canada

(N = 4,872)<sup>1</sup>

Ethnic/demographic characteristic	Dependent variable: Pride in Canada							
Aboriginal	-.056	(.058)	-.076	(.059)	-.068	(.059)	-.064	(.059)
Quebec francophone	-.238***	(.023)	-.248***	(.024)	-.250***	(.024)	-.266***	(.026)
Southern European	.019	(.037)	.070*	(.035)	.080**	(.035)	.067*	(.037)
Eastern European	-.007	(.031)	.013	(.031)	.017	(.031)	.011	(.031)
South Asian/Middle Eastern	.031	(.034)	.160***	(.029)	.167***	(.029)	.114**	(.050)
East Asian	-.137***	(.029)	.008	(.031)	.018	(.031)	.029	(.032)
Caribbean/African	-.117**	(.049)	.030	(.047)	.039	(.046)	.038	(.047)
Immigrant (first generation)			-.275***	(.034)	-.264***	(.035)	-.267***	(.035)
Years in Canada			.004***	(.001)	.003***	(.001)	.004***	(.001)
Immigrant (second generation)			-.014	(.019)	-.020	(.019)	-.016	(.019)
Age					.001***	(.000)	.001**	(.000)
Catholic, not important							.068***	(.019)
Catholic, important							.044**	(.022)
Protestant, not important							.016	(.021)
Protestant, important							.081***	(.023)
Muslim							.085	(.057)
Hindu							.144**	(.060)
Sikh							.081	(.080)
Buddhist							.060	(.067)

Source: "Equality, Security and Community Survey" (2002-03), wave II.

<sup>1</sup> Cells contain marginal effects from a binary probit estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$

## 2B. Belonging in Canada ( $N = 4,869$ )<sup>1</sup>

Ethnic/demographic characteristic	Dependent variable: Belonging in Canada			
Aboriginal	-.061 (.060)	-.069 (.060)	-.056 (.060)	-.045 (.061)
Quebec francophone	-.354*** (.020)	-.352*** (.020)	-.355*** (.020)	-.337*** (.022)
Southern European	-.099** (.039)	-.072* (.041)	-.053 (.041)	-.034 (.042)
Eastern European	-.038 (.033)	-.022 (.033)	-.017 (.033)	-.006 (.033)
South Asian/ Middle Eastern	-.198*** (.034)	-.039 (.042)	-.023 (.042)	-.107 (.065)
East Asian	-.352*** (.023)	-.242*** (.032)	-.227*** (.033)	-.205*** (.034)
Caribbean/African	-.325*** (.039)	-.204*** (.051)	-.190*** (.052)	-.199*** (.052)
Immigrant (first generation)		-.304*** (.033)	-.289*** (.033)	-.302*** (.034)
Years in Canada		.007*** (.001)	.006*** (.001)	.006*** (.001)
Immigrant (second generation)		.026 (.020)	.016 (.020)	.016 (.020)
Age			.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)
Catholic, not important				.010 (.022)
Catholic, important				-.023 (.025)
Protestant, not important				.038* (.023)
Protestant, important				.075*** (.026)
Muslim				.147** (.064)
Hindu				.170** (.075)
Sikh				.061 (.095)
Buddhist				-.088 (.088)

Source: "Equality, Security and Community Survey" (2002-03), wave II.

<sup>1</sup> Cells contain marginal effects from a binary probit estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$

## 2C. Generalized Trust

(N = 4,783)<sup>1</sup>

Ethnic/demographic characteristic	Dependent variable: Generalized Trust			
Aboriginal	-.176*** (.059)	-.182*** (.059)	-.173*** (.059)	-.174*** (.059)
Quebec francophone	-.184*** (.024)	-.189*** (.024)	-.192*** (.024)	-.187*** (.026)
Southern European	-.106*** (.040)	-.091** (.041)	-.078* (.041)	-.075* (.042)
Eastern European	-.070** (.032)	-.064* (.033)	-.059* (.033)	-.058* (.033)
South Asian/ Middle Eastern	-.201*** (.037)	-.173*** (.042)	-.162*** (.042)	-.095 (.063)
East Asian	-.110*** (.029)	-.084** (.034)	-.072** (.034)	-.086** (.035)
Caribbean/African	-.220*** (.049)	-.193*** (.053)	-.182*** (.053)	-.184*** (.054)
Immigrant (first generation)		-.048 (.035)	-.036 (.035)	-.026 (.035)
Years in Canada		.001 (.001)	-.000 (.001)	-.000 (.001)
Immigrant (second generation)		-.024 (.019)	-.030 (.019)	-.032 (.020)
Age			.001*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)
Catholic, not important				-.012 (.021)
Catholic, important				-.002 (.023)
Protestant, not important				.003 (.022)
Protestant, important				-.003 (.025)
Muslim				-.035 (.068)
Hindu				-.161* (.085)
Sikh				-.021 (.093)
Buddhist				.105 (.068)

Source: "Equality, Security and Community Survey" (2002-03), wave II.

<sup>1</sup> Cells contain marginal effects from a binary probit estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$

## 2D. Strategic Trust (Binary, $N = 4,894$ )<sup>1</sup>

Ethnic/demographic characteristic	Dependent variable: Strategic Trust			
Aboriginal	-.146*** (.055)	-.150*** (.055)	-.126** (.056)	-.113** (.057)
Quebec francophone	-.349*** (.018)	-.350*** (.018)	-.357*** (.018)	-.326*** (.021)
Southern European	-.228*** (.034)	-.219*** (.035)	-.186*** (.037)	-.156*** (.040)
Eastern European	-.034 (.032)	-.028 (.032)	-.016 (.033)	.005 (.033)
South Asian/ Middle Eastern	-.103*** (.035)	-.069* (.041)	-.036 (.041)	-.013 (.064)
East Asian	-.228*** (.025)	-.200*** (.030)	-.171*** (.032)	-.156*** (.033)
Caribbean/African	-.259*** (.040)	-.234*** (.044)	-.211*** (.047)	-.213*** (.047)
Immigrant (first generation)		-.067* (.035)	-.033 (.035)	-.030 (.036)
Years in Canada		.002 (.001)	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)
Immigrant (second generation)		-.018 (.020)	-.038* (.020)	-.039** (.020)
Age			.004*** (.000)	.004*** (.000)
Catholic, not important				-.003 (.022)
Catholic, important				-.011 (.025)
Protestant, not important				.102*** (.022)
Protestant, important				.103*** (.025)
Muslim				.090 (.070)
Hindu				-.013 (.084)
Sikh				-.007 (.097)
Buddhist				.079 (.080)

Source: "Equality, Security and Community Survey" (2002-03), wave II.

<sup>1</sup> Cells contain marginal effects from a binary probit estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$

2E. Gay Marriage<sup>1</sup>

Ethnic/demographic characteristic	Dependent variable: Gay Marriage			
Quebec francophone	.105*** (.022)	.099*** (.022)	.113*** (.022)	.090*** (.026)
Southern European	.002 (.042)	.024 (.043)	-.031 (.041)	-.026 (.043)
Eastern European	-.041 (.035)	-.032 (.036)	-.034 (.036)	-.048 (.035)
South Asian/ Middle Eastern	-.080 (.061)	.008 (.077)	-.027 (.073)	.022 (.095)
East Asian	-.057 (.051)	.006 (.063)	-.041 (.058)	-.057 (.053)
Caribbean/African	-.032 (.074)	.011 (.084)	-.047 (.075)	-.024 (.076)
Immigrant (first generation)		-.139*** (.051)	-.208*** (.042)	-.178*** (.044)
Years in Canada		.001 (.002)	.006*** (.002)	.005*** (.002)
Age			-.008*** (.001)	-.006*** (.001)
Catholic, not important				-.115*** (.022)
Catholic, important				-.214*** (.020)
Protestant, not important				-.144*** (.021)
Protestant, important				-.258*** (.017)
Muslim				-.197*** (.068)
Hindu				-.180** (.083)
Sikh				-.256*** (.053)
Buddhist				-.132* (.074)
Observations (N)	4,171	4,102	4,102	4,102

Source: "Canadian Election Survey" (2004). The data do not distinguish Aboriginal Canadians.

<sup>1</sup> Cells contain marginal effects from a binary probit estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$

2F. Women at Home<sup>1</sup>

Ethnic/demographic characteristic	Dependent variable: Women at Home							
Quebec francophone	.004	(.022)	-.010	(.022)	-.004	(.023)	-.038	(.027)
Southern European	-.063	(.044)	-.027	(.044)	-.086*	(.045)	-.092*	(.047)
Eastern European	-.083**	(.038)	-.061	(.038)	-.064*	(.038)	-.072*	(.038)
South Asian/ Middle Eastern	-.075	(.068)	-.017	(.072)	-.044	(.072)	.040	(.088)
East Asian	-.035	(.060)	.027	(.066)	-.011	(.070)	.010	(.071)
Caribbean/African	-.067	(.088)	-.014	(.092)	-.067	(.101)	-.026	(.098)
Immigrant (first generation)			-.101*	(.061)	-.196***	(.061)	-.159**	(.062)
Years in Canada			-.001	(.002)	.003**	(.002)	.002	(.002)
Age					-.007***	(.001)	-.006***	(.001)
Catholic, not important							-.033	(.027)
Catholic, important							-.160***	(.032)
Protestant, not important							-.063**	(.028)
Protestant, important							-.207***	(.029)
Muslim							-.243*	(.125)
Hindu							-.211	(.128)
Sikh							-.215	(.143)
Buddhist							-.223*	(.115)
Observations (N)		4,164		4,096		4,096		4,096

Source: "Canadian Election Survey" (2004). The data do not distinguish Aboriginal Canadians.

<sup>1</sup> Cells contain marginal effects from a binary probit estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$

2G. Membership in  
Bridging Groups  
(N = 4,903)<sup>1</sup>

Ethnic/demographic characteristic	Dependent variable: Membership in Bridging Groups			
Aboriginal	-.031 (.056)	-.028 (.056)	-.046 (.057)	-.039 (.057)
Quebec francophone	-.089*** (.023)	-.082*** (.023)	-.079*** (.023)	-.056** (.025)
Southern European	-.005 (.037)	-.004 (.038)	-.026 (.039)	-.011 (.040)
Eastern European	.065** (.029)	.065** (.029)	.059** (.029)	.069** (.029)
South Asian/ Middle Eastern	-.021 (.035)	.026 (.037)	.007 (.039)	.078 (.053)
East Asian	-.062** (.028)	-.020 (.032)	-.041 (.033)	-.029 (.033)
Caribbean/African	-.064 (.048)	-.019 (.049)	-.039 (.050)	-.021 (.050)
Immigrant (first generation)		-.083** (.033)	-.105*** (.034)	-.097*** (.035)
Years in Canada		.002* (.001)	.003*** (.001)	.003*** (.001)
Immigrant (second generation)		.046*** (.018)	.058*** (.018)	.059*** (.018)
Age			-.003*** (.000)	-.003*** (.000)
Catholic, not important				-.007 (.020)
Catholic, important				.014 (.022)
Protestant, not important				.054*** (.020)
Protestant, important				.058** (.022)
Muslim				-.087 (.070)
Hindu				-.012 (.080)
Sikh				-.201** (.099)
Buddhist				.024 (.071)

Source: "Equality, Security and Community Survey" (2002-03), wave II.

<sup>1</sup> Cells contain marginal effects from a binary probit estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$

2H. Reported Turnout  
in the 2000 Election  
( $N = 4,645$ )<sup>1</sup>

Ethnic/demographic characteristic	Dependent variable: Reported Turnout			
Aboriginal	-.147*** (.056)	-.141** (.055)	-.093* (.052)	-.082 (.051)
Quebec francophone	.043** (.018)	.048*** (.018)	.039** (.017)	.043** (.018)
Southern European	-.018 (.033)	-.029 (.036)	.033 (.028)	.031 (.029)
Eastern European	-.017 (.027)	-.005 (.026)	.011 (.024)	.016 (.024)
South Asian/ Middle Eastern	-.098** (.039)	-.039 (.039)	.026 (.031)	.038 (.045)
East Asian	-.180*** (.030)	-.105*** (.030)	-.038 (.029)	-.029 (.029)
Caribbean/African	-.152*** (.053)	-.099* (.053)	-.037 (.046)	-.035 (.046)
Immigrant (first generation)		-.231*** (.043)	-.167*** (.041)	-.159*** (.042)
Years in Canada		.008*** (.001)	.003*** (.001)	.004*** (.001)
Immigrant (second generation)		-.001 (.015)	-.027* (.016)	-.023 (.016)
Age			.007*** (.000)	.006*** (.000)
Catholic, not important				.041*** (.015)
Catholic, important				.053*** (.016)
Protestant, not important				.071*** (.014)
Protestant, important				.073*** (.015)
Muslim				.037 (.048)
Hindu				.042 (.061)
Sikh				-.023 (.084)
Buddhist				.083** (.037)

Source: "Equality, Security and Community Survey" (2002-03), wave II.

<sup>1</sup> Cells contain marginal effects from a binary probit estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$

## Notes

- 1 Research for this chapter was made possible by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We are grateful for comments from Professor Bonnie Erickson, other participants in “The Art of the State III: Diversity and Canada’s Future,” an anonymous reviewer and the editors of this volume. However, we remain solely responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation. This chapter builds on several related works: Soroka, Johnston, and Banting (2004, 2005); Soroka, Banting, and Johnston (2006); and Banting and Kymlicka (2004). For a synthesis of this work, see Banting (2005).
- 2 On the extent to which the Dutch reaction against immigration and multiculturalism, including the early opposition led by Pim Fortuyn, has reflected concern about illiberal attitudes among the minority population, see Entzinger (2006, 183-7); see also Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004).
- 3 In the United Kingdom, for example, Trevor Phillips, chair of the Commission for Racial Equality — and himself a Black person — has argued that multiculturalism is no longer an appropriate goal: “Multiculturalism suggests separateness,” and “we need to assert that there is a core of Britishness.” Phillips continues: “What we should be talking about is how we reach an integrated society, one in which people are equal under the law, where there are some common values — democracy rather than violence, the common currency of the English language, honouring the culture of these islands, like Shakespeare and Dickens” (cited in Baldwin 2004).
- 4 The ESCS dataset combines a national probability sample of residents (including noncitizens) aged 18 and over with a Montreal-Toronto-Vancouver metropolitan oversample drawn disproportionately from telephone exchanges known to overrepresent visible minorities. This boosts the absolute numbers of visible minority respondents, and it compensates for the endemic underrepresentation of such groups in telephone samples. The sample is thus not a probability one overall, but no weighting is necessary as all groups that are systematically over- (or, by implication, under-) sampled are represented by a parameter in the multivariate estimation. The CES uses a national probability sample of voting-age citizens. Both the ESCS and the CES are telephone surveys and were conducted in English or French, which may bias the sample of immigrants toward those at least partially integrated into Canadian society.
- 5 In a small number of cases, the imputation may deploy several queries: multiple ethnic probes, place of own or parents’ birth, as well as (in about 15 cases) religion. For example, a respondent of Caribbean birth but of Hindu religion would be assigned to the South Asian category. As another example, “French” denotes either language *or* ancestry. On the latter, preliminary analyses suggested that ancestry was as important as current language mastery in predicting attitudes. The British/northern European group includes respondents who identify themselves as of British or northern European descent, as well as those respondents who identify themselves only as Canadians and whose first language is English. Those of British and northern European origin are combined because their responses to the questions we have an interest in here are essentially indistinguishable. To report them separately in each figure and table would simply be to introduce clutter. The rules of assignment were, frankly, inductive.
- 6 The imperative here is methodological. The critical objective is to define a reference group that is never empty. In multivariate estimation, the reference group for the whole equation comprises all respondents who score zero on all variables for which

zero is an available value. Given the number of dimensions in the set-up, at least some of the reference categories must be big by construction, otherwise we risk having an empty base. If the reference group is empty, the variance-covariance matrix is not invertible, and the equation cannot be identified.

- 7 This is equivalent to entering “French” and “Quebec” as dummy-variable main effects, the product of the two as an interaction, and then summing up all the coefficients. In our simple set-up, francophones outside Quebec are included in the British/northern European reference category.
- 8 Interestingly, the Social Capital Benchmark Survey in the US suggests that participation in both bridging and bonding groups tends to decline in more diverse communities. Americans in such communities seem to be retreating not only from groups that include people of other ethnic backgrounds, but also from groups made up of people of their own background. Putnam argues that Americans in diverse communities seem to be “hunkering down” in personal rather than civic space (2004).
- 9 The vast majority of respondents say either “very proud” (66 percent) or “quite proud” (28 percent). We accordingly focus on “very proud” on its own, as it better divides our sample.
- 10 We do this for the same reasons outlined in the previous note — on the belonging scale, the vast majority of respondents selected a number above seven.
- 11 We recognize that at best our indicator captures the potential for network diversity, not the actuality. Bonnie Erickson has presented a sensitive discussion of indicators of bridging as part of the sociology of weak ties. She recommends using a “position generator,” an example of which is publicly available in the 2000 CES (Erickson 2004). We elected to stay with the ESCS indicator because of the ESCS data set’s richer set of demographic variables and because brid-

ing imputations are possible for no more than 1,539 respondents in the 2000 CES (42 percent of the total sample), as the position generator was the last question on the third, mail-back wave.

- 12 Although this is an electoral question, we used the ESCS data again because of its rich demographics, in particular its capture of second-generation status. The election in question is the 2000 one.
- 13 The 95 percent confidence interval is slightly different for each ethnic group, as it is related to sample size, and the sample size for each group is different. The line shown in these figures is thus based on the average 95 percent confidence interval for the seven ethnic groups. It consequently tends to overestimate the limit for larger groups, so southern and Eastern Europeans will have significant differences even when they are a little below this line; conversely smaller groups such as East Asians and Caribbean/Africans will have differences that are insignificant even when they marginally exceed this line. We nevertheless opt for this single-line strategy here: the use of a 95 percent confidence interval is a subjective decision rather than a hard-and-fast rule anyway, and a single line — even with its minor inefficiencies — provides a useful reference point to compare results across groups. The exact significance of each coefficient is reflected in the appendix 2 tables.
- 14 Controlling for religion complicates the South Asian/Middle Eastern story a bit, as the coefficients shrink back toward zero at this stage. This mainly reflects the fact that Hindus and Muslims are especially proud of Canada, so the ethnic coefficient now captures something intrinsic to the region that is independent of its complex makeup; there is nothing intrinsic to the region that distinguishes it as a source of pride in Canada.
- 15 The effect of immigration is complicated somewhat by the fact that age is negatively related to support but positively related to

number of years in the country. Controlling for age thus causes the ethnic coefficients to bounce back to negative values: by implication, for instance, a South Asian of a given age will be more conservative than a northern European of the same age. But the average South Asian is younger than the average northern European, and this pushes toward liberal values.

- 16 For instance, coefficients (see appendix 2, tables 2B, 2C and 2D) suggest that the considerably weaker sense of belonging felt by new immigrants dissipates entirely in about 55 years. This obviously exceeds the lifespan of many immigrants, but even within their lifetime, a considerable portion of the difference disappears.
- 17 On the distinction between identity and attachment, see Mendelsohn (2002).

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